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Construction Performance Bond Surety Relieved of Liability Because Bond Owner Did Not Provide Timely Notice of Default

A recent decision from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals provides notice to construction performance bond owners and sureties that a bond owner may forfeit its rights under a bond if timely notice of default is not provided to the surety. See Western Surety Company v. U.S. Engineering Construction, LLC, — F.3d —, 2020 WL 1684040 (April 7, 2020)  In this case, the appellate court affirmed a district court’s summary judgment decision dismissing claims against a surety under a construction performance bond because the surety had not received timely notice of a default and therefore was prejudiced by its inability to have an opportunity to cure the default.   Subcontractor U.S. Engineering Construction, LLC (“U.S. Engineering”) contracted with sub-subcontractor United Sheet Metal for sheet metal work relating to the construction of a new South African embassy in Washington, D.C.  U.S. Engineering paid the premiums for a construction performance bond from Western Surety Company to ensure completion of United Sheet Metal’s work.  The parties entered into an AIA A312-2010 contract for the performance bond, which included a requirement under Section 3 for U.S. Engineering to provide Western Surety with notice if it considered declaring United Sheet Metal in default.  The bond did not explicitly state the required timing for such notice. United Sheet Metal failed to perform under its contract and U.S. Engineering terminated its subcontract with United Sheet Metal without any prior notice to Western Surety.  In fact, U.S. Engineering waited more than eight months after terminating United Sheet Metal before notifying Western Surety of the default, which notification only occurred when it filed a notice of claim against the bond. The district court granted Western Surety’s motion for summary judgment on the basis that timely notice was not provided under the bond.  In affirming that decision, the appellate court determined that U.S. Engineer’s delay precluded a claim under the bond.  Western Surety was harmed by the delay because “[b]y unilaterally completing United Sheet Metal’s remaining contractual obligations before notifying Western Surety, U.S. Engineering deprived Western Surety of its contractually agreed-upon opportunity to participate in remedying United Sheet Metal’s default.”  The appellate court concluded that, “because the bond expressly provides the surety with the opportunity to participate in curing the subcontractor’s default, we hold that it is a condition precedent to the surety’s obligations under the bond that the owner must provide timely notice to the surety of any default and termination before it elects to remedy that default on its own terms.” This case serves as a reminder for construction companies and sureties to review and follow the terms of a bond before taking any actions to enforce it, and that timely notice may be required in order to give the surety an opportunity to cure the default, even if not the bond does not explicitly state a deadline for such notice.

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Uncertain Surety: Expiration Of A Limitation Against A Principal Is Not A Defence To A Bond Claim

Sometimes failing to arbitrate a dispute with a binding arbitration provision can be fatal to a claim under a construction contract, particularly if the limitation period to commence the arbitration has expired.  But, in the case of a project with a performance bond, things can sometimes become more complex. Performance bonds are a common tool on major construction projects. They are three-party contracts: the obligee (the party to whom the obligation under the bond is owed; typically an owner, although can be a general contractor on large projects in which multiple levels of bonding are in place); the principal (the party performing the work under the bonded contract; typically a general contractor, although can be a subcontractor on large projects in which multiple levels of bonding are in place); and the surety (an insurance company). If the bonded contract proceeds without issue between the obligee and the principal, then the surety plays no role in the project. However, if issues arise between the obligee and the principal and the principal is declared to be in default of the bonded contract, then the surety is required to step in and investigate. The surety can either deny or allow the bond claim. If the claim is allowed, then the surety essentially steps into the shoes of the principal, and has the same defences available to it as against the obligee as did the principal under the bonded contract prior to its default. A Surety Cannot Rely on the Expiration of a Claim against the Principal to Deny a Bond Claim However, the Alberta Court of Appeal in HOOPP Realty Inc v Guarantee Company of North America, 2019 ABCA 443 held that the expiry of an obligee’s limitation period to sue the principal does not provide the same limitations defence to a surety in the face of a bond claim lawsuit. In that case, Clark Builders (“Clark”) was the principal/general contractor, HOOPP Realty (“HOOPP”) was the obligee/owner, and The Guarantee Company (“GCNA”) was the surety. Clark was hired to construct a warehouse. HOOPP was unhappy with the warehouse floor. Clark replaced the floor at its own cost, but argued it was not required to do so under the bonded contract. The parties agreed the performance bond would extend to the floor replacement if Clark was in default of the bonded contract. In litigation between HOOPP and Clark, the Court of Appeal held that the dispute was subject to a mandatory arbitration clause, and HOOPP could not maintain a Court action. Subsequently, the Court held that HOOPP was limitation-barred from commencing an arbitration against Clark, and as such, HOOPP could not maintain any claim, in Court or arbitration, against Clark. HOOPP had commenced a separate, parallel action against GCNA under the bond, which it continued to pursue notwithstanding the dismissal of its claim against Clark. The issue then was whether GCNA was also immune from liability to HOOPP, given that HOOPP’s claim against Clark was limitation-barred. The matter was heard via summary trial. The trial judge concluded that GCNA was not relieved of liability, as the expiry of a limitation period does not necessarily extinguish the underlying debt, but only bars the remedy against the defendant. In addition, the trial judge held that HOOPP had distinct claims against Clark and GCNA, even if those claims may overlap. The Court of appeal upheld this decision. It noted that the general statement that a surety is entitled to any defence available to the principal is accurate when related to the principal’s liability under the bonded contract. However, when the issue is whether the surety is directly liable to the obligee, that is a separate issue. The Court confirmed that the surety’s liability under the bond required that the principal had defaulted under the bonded contract. But in the facts at bar, where there was an alleged default by the principal, the obligee had a potential independent claim against both the principal and the surety. This was supported by the bond wording in this case, which provided that the surety and principal were jointly and severally liable under the bond. In addition, the Court noted that an obligee is not required to exhaust all remedies against the principal in order to advance a claim against a surety. While HOOPP in this case had made an attempt to sue Clark, the Court noted that the outcome of the appeal would have been the same even if no such attempt had been made. Finally, the Court rejected GCNA’s argument that by permitting HOOPP’s claim against GCNA to proceed, it was allowing HOOPP to indirectly pursue Clark. GCNA argued that if HOOPP made a successful claim against GCNA, GCNA would then have an indemnity claim against Clark; i.e. in the end, Clark would still be liable for HOOPP’s claim despite the expiration of HOOPP’s limitation period to sue Clark directly.   The Court held that Clark, as principal, did not have the protection of a limitations defence until the limitation had expired against both it as principal and GCNA as surety. Similarly, GCNA, as surety, did not have the protection of a limitations defence until the limitation had expired against both it as surety and Clark as principal. In other words, if GCNA was held liable to HOOPP, GCNA could then pursue an indemnity claim against Clark. While many of the Court’s comments were general principles applying to all performance bonds, in the end it was clear that the result on this appeal depended on the wording of the GCNA bond. In particular, the Court noted there was nothing in this bond requiring HOOPP to exhaust its remedies against Clark in order to maintain a bond claim against GCNA. The Supreme Court of Canada has now refused leave to appeal for this matter, so it remains the law applicable in Alberta.  The case adds another level of complexity when trying to assess limitation periods in the context of projects with mandatory arbitration provisions coupled with separate performance bonds. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/uncertain-surety-expiration-of-a-74015/

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Surety’s claims against bank fail [Hudson]

A surety that paid out more than $3.7 million in claims failed in its attempt to sue the principal’s bank because its claims were time-barred, a negligence claim failed as a matter of law, there was no confidential relationship as required for a constructive fraud claim and the elements of breach of trust, constructive trust or accounting were not satisfied. Background In 2009, Andy Persaud, president of Persaud Companies Inc., or PCI, opened an account at the Bank of Georgetown. In December 2010, Persaud established a bonding program with Hudson Insurance Company, a surety that agreed to issue payment and performance bonds on PCI’s behalf. In the course of underwriting the bonding program, Hudson’s agent obtained from Persaud documents showing all banks with a security interest in PCI as well as the promissory note and loan documents between PCI and the bank. In late 2011, Persaud requested an expansion of the bonding program. Hudson agreed to execute an amended general indemnity agreement on two conditions: first, that an additional indemnitor be added, and second, that all funds from contracts relating to the agreement run through a third-party escrow account. Gary W. Day agreed to serve as a second indemnitor in exchange for payment to Day of 1% of the face amount of all bonds issued by Hudson. A few months later in the spring of 2012, Hudson began receiving claims on PCI’s projects. Hudson ultimately lost $3.7 million by paying out claims related to PCI. Hudson and Day obtained default judgments against PCI and Persaud, who is believed to be penniless. Day obtained the assignment of Hudson’s claims against the bank. Day asserts that, had Hudson been aware of the nature of the banking relationship between Persaud and the bank, it would never have agreed to issue the bonds on which it suffered losses. Analysis The district court held Day failed to state a claim and so dismissed his suit, and, alternatively, granted summary judgment finding all of Day’s claims time-barred. With respect to the latter, it recognized that, under Maryland law, an action only accrues when the claimant in fact knew or was on inquiry notice of the alleged wrong. The court concluded that Day was on inquiry notice no later than October 2011, when Day, Hudson, and Persaud executed the amended general indemnity agreement. At that time, Hudson was already concerned about the state of Persaud’s finances and possessed the bank’s UCC filing and the loan documents memorializing the agreement between the bank and Persaud. We agree with the district court’s analysis. The latest Day could have filed suit within the limitations period was therefore October 2014; he did not actually file suit until April 2016. Day’s claim is therefore time-barred. We also agree that Day’s complaint fails to state a claim. The district court rejected Day’s negligence claim on multiple grounds, concluding that the statute did not establish a duty to Day on the part of the bank and that Maryland law precluded Day’s recovery in tort for purely  economic losses. Next, the court dismissed Day’s attempts to sue directly under the anti-assignment act, concluding that Day lacked a cause of action and that there was no authority to support his argument that he may be subrogated to the government. Day’s constructive fraud claim also failed because, as the district court explained, Day could show neither violation of a duty nor the existence of a confidential relationship between Day and the bank, both necessary prerequisites to stating a constructive fraud claim. Finally, the district court properly dismissed Day’s counts seeking equitable relief, noting that Day could not meet the elements of breach of trust, constructive trust or accounting. This analysis is sound. Affirmed. Day v. United Bank, Appeal No. 18-1961, Feb. 20, 2020. 4th Cir. (per curiam), from DMD at Greenbelt (Xinis). David Hilton Wise for Appellant, Richard E. Hagerty for Appellee. VLW 020-2-036. 6 pp.

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legislation

Quebec Court orders “modest” $1 million suretyship for short-term stay of Canadian enforcement pending U.S. annulment

In Lakah v. UBS, 2019 QCCA 1869, the Court of Appeal of Québec denied leave to appeal a Superior Court decision that ordered than an arbitral party post a $1 million suretyship pending U.S. annulment proceedings. The Court of Appeal, in a very brief judgment, based its decision on the following considerations: The decision to impose a surety of $1 million was a matter of discretion and was governed by a standard of reasonableness; A surety of $1 million was not unreasonable considering that the arbitral award was in excess of US$150 million; The Superior Court decision was not inconsistent with the principle of proportionality in civil proceedings; and A stay of proceedings is a case management measure and, in principle, cannot be appealed barring exceptional circumstances. Background of Facts An arbitral award was issued on November 2, 2018 that required that Michel Lakah (“Mr. Lakah”) pay US$151,603,902.00 plus 12% interest per annum to UBS AG et al. (“UBS”). On February 4, 2019, Mr. Lakah applied to vacate the Arbitral Award before the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York. Although no exact date has been set for the hearing of the application, a judgment is expected to be rendered by the U.S. District Court by December 2019. The Superior Court’s Decision In June 2019, in the face of the application to vacate the arbitral award in the United States, UBS applied to the Québec Superior Court in Montreal to recognize and enforce the Arbitral Award (the “Enforcement Proceedings”). Invoking article 654 of Québec’s Code of Civil Procedure, which was modeled after article 36(2) of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), Mr. Lakah sought to stay the Enforcement Proceedings until a final decision was rendered on the application to vacate before the U.S. District Court. In response, UBS requested that Mr. Lakah post a $5 million suretyship in the event that the Superior Court issued a stay. Justice Peter Kalichman of the Québec Superior Court noted that the right to a stay under article 654 C.C.P. is not automatic and should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, as a stay “impedes one of the key goals of arbitration, which is to avoid protracted litigation”. However, Justice Kalichman noted that the grounds alleged in the U.S. annulment proceedings “appeared serious” on their face and merited a stay of the Enforcement Proceedings, which was limited to a period of sixty days following the release of the decision in the application to vacate. After determining that a temporary stay was justified, Justice Kalichman stated that Mr. Lakah had the burden of resisting suretyship by demonstrating that he lacked the means to satisfy such an order, which he failed to do. The Court ultimately ordered Mr. Lakah to provide a suretyship in the amount of $1 million, noting that it was a “relatively modest” amount considering the quantum of the arbitral award. Court of Appeal Decision Mr. Lakah sought leave to appeal the Superior Court’s decision, claiming that the order to provide a $1 million surety was “unreasonable in the light of the guiding principles of procedure” and that the decision was “manifestly erroneous in fact and in law[1]”. Justice Patrick Healy held that a stay of proceedings is a case management measure and cannot be appealed barring “exceptional circumstances” in which the “ruling appears unreasonable” and results in a serious prejudice[2]. Justice Healy added that the decision to impose a surety of $1 million was “essentially a matter of discretion that is governed by a standard of reasonableness.” Quoting Justice Kalichman, he agreed that in an action of over $150 million, a surety of $1 million was “modest” and could not possible be considered unreasonable[3]. Finally, Justice Healy noted that nothing in the file established prima facie that the Superior Court decision was inconsistent with the principle of proportionality in civil proceedings and that nothing would “justify interference with the judge’s exercise of discretion under article 654 C.C.P.”[4] Implications to Arbitral Proceedings This case is representative of Canadian courts’ pro-arbitration stance and the reluctance to permit parties to engage in conduct that may result in parallel proceedings. Indeed, the Court of Appeal confirmed that a court’s exceptional power to stay the enforcement of an arbitral award pending an application to vacate that very award is entirely consistent with the general judicial policy in favour of the enforcement of arbitral awards. https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/blogs/international-arbitration-blog/quebec-court-orders-modest-1-million-suretyship-short-term-stay-canadian-enforcement-pending-us-annulment?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original

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Nationwide attorney: Insurer not surety of shop’s work, but will pay until right

An attorney for Nationwide told the Pennsylvania Supreme Court last month that the insurer didn’t count as a surety responsible for the quality of its repair shops’ work. The Nov. 21 comments by Derecht lawyer Robert Heim during oral argument for Berg v. Nationwide provide consumers — and DRP shops — a view into how a carrier might view a DRP relationship. (Special thanks to PCNTV, whose video coverage of the oral arguments identified speakers and allowed us to capture what was said at the proceedings.) The Supreme Court had agreed in March to re-examine Pennsylvania Superior Court 2-1 decision in the long-running case. The Superior Court had determined Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey Sprecher overreached in finding Nationwide’s behavior bad faith and awarding $21 million in damages. Nationwide had suggested plaintiffs Daniel and Sheryl Berg (who died during the course of the litigation) have their 3-month-old, leased 1996 Jeep Grand Cherokee repaired at one of its direct repair program shops following a 1996 crash, according to a 2017 summary of the case by collision industry attorney Erica Eversman and another summary by plaintiffs’ attorney Mayerson Law. Heim said Nov. 21 the record showed that plaintiff Daniel Berg selected the Blue Ribbon shop, Lindgren Chrysler-Plymouth, based on prior work it had performed. Lindgren estimated Sept. 10, 1996, the repair would cost $12,326.50, but also had called the Grand Cherokee a total loss given its frame damage. Nationwide opted not to total the vehicle, and a claims log item notes: “REPAIRS ARE APPROXIMATELY 50% of ACV NATIONWIDE WILL NEVER RECOVER THE DIFFERENCE IN SALVAGE VALUE.” Four months later, the Jeep Grand Cherokee work was finished, with some of the frame work outsourced to a third party. The vehicle was unsafe, but Nationwide either didn’t inspect it as it should have or did inspect it and didn’t tell the Bergs, Sprecher concluded in 2014. Sprecher in 2015 decried Nationwide’s attempt to use a “scorched earth” litigation policy costing $3 million in its own attorneys fees and notes “several legal duties and fiduciary obligations that it recklessly disregarded.” He awarded $18 million plus another $3 million based on what Nationwide paid in its own attorneys. The Superior Court’s overturning of Sprecher’s decision appears to mean that Nationwide would only be responsible for the $295 in actual damages a jury awarded for finding Nationwide violated Pennsylvania’s unfair trade practices law. The jury also determined Lindgren should have to pay $1,925 in compensatory damages. Duty just to pay? Berg sued Lindgren and received a judgment for poor repairs, Heim told the Supreme Court Nov. 21, “which is the way this should have worked. Nationwide’s duty, under its policy, was to pay.” Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice David Wecht said an “interesting” legal issue involved whether there was a “guarantee” and/or “heightened duty” in a DRP network. Presumably in developing such a network, Nationwide procedures exist to “inspect these shops and maintain certain standards,” Wecht said. Heim said there was a “heightened guarantee” over what support the consumer would receive should they pick a non-network body shop. If the non-Blue Ribbon body shop erred, the customer’s recourse would be to take action against the shop, Heim said. But using a DRP shop offered a “heightened guarantee” in which Nationwide would stand behind such a consumer until that repair was done, he said. Asked by Justice Max Baer if Nationwide agreed that it was the “surety” of its Blue Ribbon direct repair shops, Heim said “no.” How could the carrier offer a guarantee the work would be appropriate but not be the “guarantor of the work,” Baer asked. The insurer offered a guarantee that if their DRP shop’s work was wrong, “they will continue to pay for it until it is done correctly,” Heim said. “That’s really what it is, judge.” Plaintiff’s attorney Kenneth Behrend of Behrend & Ernsberger also addressed Nationwide’s duty regarding repair quality. However, he largely seemed to tie that responsibility to the insurer’s election to repair the Jeep rather than Lindgren being a DRP shop. https://www.repairerdrivennews.com/2019/12/10/nationwide-attorney-insurer-not-surety-of-shops-work-but-will-pay-until-right/

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How this surety bond could be examined by Supreme Court of Canada

When do the terms of a surety bond allow a construction project owner to withhold payments to a contractor? This question could go to the Supreme Court of Canada, which recently announced a federal crown corporation wants to appeal a Newfoundland court decision resulting from a $2.3-million ferry wharf construction project that did not get finished on time and spawned a lawsuit. In 2013, Western Surety Company wrote a $1.6-million performance bond for RJG Construction Limited in connection with a ferry wharf construction project in Argentia, Nfld. for Marine Atlantic Inc., which operates ferry service between North Sydney, N.S. and Argentia. After delays in the work and delays in payments, Marine Atlantic and RJG Construction sued one another, each claiming the other was in breach of contract. Western Surety is not a party to the lawsuit. In RJG Construction Limited v. Marine Atlantic, released Feb. 23, 2018, Justice James Adams of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador awarded Marine Atlantic $1.3 million for the extra money Marine Atlantic said it had to pay to complete the project using a different contractor That was overturned in 2019, with the Court of Appeal for Newfoundland and Labrador quashing the damage award and remitting the matter back to the Supreme Court, General Division, to assess damages owed by Marine Atlantic to RJG. Marine Atlantic is applying for leave to appeal that ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada announced Nov. 29. The top court could dismiss the leave application – in which case, the appeal court ruling stands – or decide to hear an appeal. A surety bond – which construction firms often must obtain before being awarded contracts – is a three-way contract for the benefit of the client’s clients. The insurer (the surety) writes a bond for its customer (the principal). If the principal fails to fulfill the terms of its contract, a surety bond could be payable to an obligee (such as a construction project owner) which is the principal’s customer. A performance bond in intended to provide assurance to a project owner that a project will actually get done. In the case of Marine Atlantic, the contract it awarded to RJG required RJG to complete the wharf project by June 15, 2013. But by October the wharf project was still not done. In January, 2014, RJG and Marine Atlantic both purported to terminate the contract, after Marine Atlantic froze some payments to RJG. Rather than pay the entire cost of the project when it was completed, the contract provided for the owner to make several progress payments after portions of work were done. In December, 2013, Marine Atlantic refused to release the fifth progress payment. Marine Atlantic was seeking a remediation agreement and had told RJG if no agreement was reached then funds that Marine Atlantic owed to RJG would be withheld to cover any additional costs incurred by Marine Atlantic in completing the project. Initially in 2018, Justice Adams ruled that Marine Atlantic was entitled to freeze payments to RJG in order to protect itself under the performance bond – which is a separate contract from the construction project. The construction contract gave Marine Atlantic the right to use any payments due to RJG to pay the cost of correcting RJG’s default, Justice Adams reasoned. That finding was overturned on appeal. Marine Atlantic told both Western Surety and RJG that, in Marine Atlantic’s view, RJG was in default by not meeting the construction schedule. At that point, Western Surety had four options: remedy the default; complete the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions; obtain a bid from other contractors to complete the contract; or pay the project owner (Marine Atlantic) the amount of the bid bond (or the owners’ proposed cost of completion) less the balance of the contract price. The construction contract between Marine Atlantic and RJG gives the owner the right to take possession of the work if the owner terminates the contract. Under that clause, the owner could withhold payments if it terminates the contract and charge the contractor the extra cost for the owner to continue the work. But that can only happen if the owner actually terminates the contract, Justice Francis O’Brien wrote on behalf of the appeal court in its unanimous ruling. The contract does not permit Marine Atlantic to freeze funds while the contract is ongoing, noted Justice O’Brien. Marine Atlantic did not actually correct a default at the time it was withholding payments, Justice O’Brien added. Therefore, Marine Atlantic did not incur any costs for which it would need to withhold funds from the contractor. “The fact that Western Surety had various options under the performance bond contract, and the fact that Marine Atlantic was waiting for Western Surety to select an option, did not entitle Marine Atlantic to freeze ‘any and all funds’ until an option had been chosen and acted upon by the surety,” Justice O’Brien wrote in the ruling against Marine Atlantic. “The language of the performance bond contract simply does not support such an interpretation.” Ultimately, the appeal court ruled that by freezing funds, Marine Atlantic repudiated the contract, meaning RJG was entitled to terminate the contract and seek damages. Citing previous court decisions involving surety bonds, Justice O’Brien wrote that if a contractor earns money and is not paid for that work, that money cannot be retained for the benefit of the obligee (in this case Marine Atlantic) or the surety (Western Surety) because to do so would mean the oblige or surety is enriched by RJG’s unpaid work under the contract. “Significantly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the bondholder, Western Surety, agreed with the position taken by Marine Atlantic’s counsel,” wrote Justice O’Brien. “There is no evidence that Western Surety suggested or directed that Marine Atlantic freeze these funds. At no time did Western Surety indicate that payment of these funds to RJG could contravene Marine Atlantic’s obligations to Western Surety or cause prejudice which might void

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